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ABSTRACT
Some information system (IS) studies have adopted organisational culture (OC) theory to investigate 
IS implementations. The studies highlight that members will reach consensus or agreement in the use 
of an IS but also experience inevitable tensions and ambiguities in the utilization of the IS. However, 
literature related to IS implementation/OC has rarely examined the influence that the saliency of 
specific cultural practices may have on the success or failure of IS implementations. Using a case 
study approach, we adopted the “soft positivism” research philosophy to collect data, underpinned 
by Martin’s (1992) integration and differentiation perspectives of OC to study the organisational 
implementation of an IS. These perspectives served as interpretive lenses through which to explain 
how members’ salient behaviours towards an IS evolved during the implementation process. Our 
study augments the IS implementation/OC literature by demonstrating how salient cultural practices 
influence the outcome of IS implementation.
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INTROdUCTION
In many cases, the failure of an information system (IS) is due not to technical deficiencies, but to 
organisational issues such as user resistance or resistance to new working practices engineered by the 
introduction of the system (Rivard, Lapointe, & Kappos, 2011; Wagner & Newell, 2011). Thus IS 
failure may be due to a gap between members working values/practices and the implemented IS, or 
an organisation’s inability to clearly recognise how its members different operating values/practices 
impact IS implementation processes/activities or vice-versa. Thus, many IS implementation studies 
have adopted organisational culture (OC) theory (e.g. Alavi, Kayworth, & Leidner, 2006; Iivari 
& Huisman, 2007) to explain how members respond to ISs in their everyday work, and how these 
responses influence the implementation process.
The aforementioned examples of IS-culture studies suggest that culture at the organisational level 
is delicate and has a strong influence on how organisations may cope with, and adapt to, organisational 
issues that emerge during the implementation of an IS. These studies have assumed that organisational 
groups/members will always have the same perceptions of, and behaviours toward, an implemented 
IS. However, Reinecke & Bernstein (2013 p. 429) argue, “culture does not produce groups of people 
with uniform codes of behaviour, but creates groups that share similar thinking to some extent,” 
suggesting that culture is not always homogenous. Therefore, there is a need to address the likelihood 
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of competing cultures, conflicts and opposing IS outcomes arising among organisational subgroups 
when an IS is implemented (Ravishankar, Pan, & Leidner, 2011). Organisational subgroup members 
who have different job functions are likely to have different interpretations and attitudes towards an IS 
in their attempts to develop and use the system (Koch, Leidner, & Gonzalez, 2013; Wagner & Newell, 
2011). Thus, a consideration of culture that is limited to the organisational level may be insufficient 
to understand the outcome of IS implementation (Rivard et al., 2011).
To facilitate richer interpretations of organisational implementations of IS, studies have 
investigated culture at the subgroup level to explain how IS development and IS use can be impacted by 
subgroups that are in conflicting relationships with one another (e.g. Ravishankar et al., 2011; Rivard 
et al., 2011). We argue that considering OC and organisational subcultures as firmly grounded concepts 
provide nuanced explanations of how members’ values, beliefs and practices at the organisational and 
subgroup levels influence the development and usage of IS. Despite the extant literature, indicating the 
apparent strengths of adopting the organisational and subgroup perspectives of culture to investigate 
IS implementations, it remains to be seen, the influence the saliency of specific cultural practices 
may have on an IS implementation outcome – that is, IS failure or IS success (Rivard et al., 2011). 
Exploring this would facilitate explanations of how and why members’ interpretations and behaviours 
towards an IS are shaped and may change during implementation processes, and how OC influences 
implementation outcomes. This view contributes to the emergent view identified by some IS-culture 
studies that the relationship between culture and IS efforts are continuously evolving and dynamic 
(e.g. Gallivan & Srite, 2005; Iivari & Iivari, 2011; Leidner, 2010).
We predict that taking the evolving and dynamic view of culture will help advance our 
understanding of IS implementation, and explain how and why ISs fail or succeed. This will help 
organisations draw attention not only to organisation-wide practices but also to deviances among 
subgroups. In turn, organisations implementing IS cannot only take a ‘top-down’ organisational-level 
approach but also understand ‘bottom-up’ responses to the implementation process, consequently 
providing a better chance for IS success. We take organisational values to be appropriate to understand 
OC because the interpretations of values reflect deep assumptions (Martin, 2002). Therefore, our 
primary research question is: How do salient organisation-wide and subgroup values influence the 
outcome of IS implementation? To answer this question, we draw on Martin’s (1992) perspectives 
of OC to examine the impact that integrated and differentiated values may have on the outcome of 
an IS implementation.
The next sections provide an overview of the extant research on organisational implementations 
of IS, before briefly reviewing the OC literature with particular reference to the impact on IS 
implementations. Subsequently, we outline our methodology, followed by our results, discussion, 
and conclusion.
ORGANISATIONAL IMPLeMeNTATIONS OF IS 
IS implementation studies focus on adoption decisions and post-adoption activities, to explain the 
challenges organisations face during attempts to achieve a successful implementation outcome (see 
Cooper & Zmud, 1990; Zhu, Kraemer, & Xu, 2006). These said studies suggest that to make successful 
IS implementation, majority of organisational members must use the implemented IS in an effective 
and efficient manner to facilitate full implementation of the system into the organisational settings. 
More recently, Burton-Jones & Grange (2012) also highlight the importance of the “effective use”, a 
concept to helping organisations achieving their goals for implementing and IS. Work of Bagayogo, 
Lapointe & Bassellier (2014) complements Burton-Jones & Grange’s (2012) view of effective IT 
use. Bagayogo et al. (2014) provide insights into the dynamics involved in user interactions with IS 
by offering a slightly different conceptualisation to effective use. They introduced the concept of 
enhanced IS use to explain patterns of feature use that could affect effective use, vital for achieving 
organisational goals and organisational performance during IS implementation. Nonetheless, Burton-
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Jones & Grange (2012) draw attention to the fact that an IS implementation outcome is dependent 
not only on the system but also included the organisational members and their context of use of the 
system i.e. organisational factors. Mishra & Agarwal (2010) offer more elaborate explanations on 
how organisational factors influence IS implementation. They draw on managerial and organisational 
sensemaking and the organisational capabilities literature to develop and propose a model to 
understand the continued use of IS. The results from their model testing suggest that organisations’ 
sense and response capabilities significantly influence organisational decision-making about IS use. 
In a different study, McMaster & Wastell (2005) investigated how IS members of a local government 
agency developed and deployed a Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) system. McMaster & 
Wastell (2005) point out, factors such as strong leadership, engagement of organisational members 
and the fortuitous occurrence of a series of local crises were vital antecedents for the successful 
implementation process. These studies implicitly highlight the complexities of the context of use 
and how social dynamics shape the implementation and use of IS. Nonetheless, Leonardi & Barley 
(2010) explicitly argue that five perspectives - perception, interpretation, appropriation, enactment, 
and alignment is a comprehensive approach to explain the social construction of IS implementation. 
They take these perspectives to explain how social dynamics (i.e. attitudes, beliefs, and values) shape 
different stages of the IS implementation process i.e. pre- implementation, implementation and post-
implementation and the meaning technology has on the various stages.
The studies above are concerned with how organisations and their members make sense of, 
use and incorporate IS into their structures, processes, and work practices. This highlights why the 
organisational culture (OC) theory has been applied in IS studies to explain how organisational 
members enact IS in their everyday work, and why they respond to IS implementation in manners they 
do i.e. favourable or unfavourable responses (see Koch et al., 2013; Ravishankar et al., 2011). OC can be 
vital for understanding IS implementation; especially in trying to achieve desirable behaviours during 
the post-adoptive and acceptance stages of IS because the activities in these implementation stages 
are distinct from each other. Therefore, users’ interactions with an IS in the different implementation 
stages (Cooper & Zmud, 1990) may result in users having different interpretations and attitudes when 
interacting with the system during the implementation process. Against this backdrop, our study 
proposes that OC theory can be helpful in providing deeper insights into the dynamic activities that 
ensue during IS implementation.
ORGANISATIONAL CULTURe ANd IS IMPLeMeNTATION
Researchers have taken different paradigms to define the concept of organisational culture (OC). Two 
main distinct paradigms of OC are the functionalist and the interpretivist paradigms.
The functional studies of OC suggest culture as something an organisation possesses based on 
agreed assumptions, beliefs, and practices (Smircich, 1983). Furthermore, Smircich (1983) argued 
that studies that take the functionalist paradigm to OC treat culture as a variable to create a link with 
other variables such as commitment and productivity, so as to offer direction to how culture may 
impact organisational goals i.e. better productivity and efficiency. Schein (1992) draws from the 
functionalist perspective to argue that culture exists at three levels (assumptions/beliefs, values/norms 
and artefacts). He further claims that among the three levels, espoused values are more visible, and 
members are more aware of them.
Alavi et al. (2006) adopt Schein’s (1992) perspective of cultural values to investigate how OC 
influences the use of knowledge management systems (KMS) to achieve successful knowledge 
management (KM) practices. They report that there are discoverable relationships between 
organisational values and members’ behaviors on IS use. For example, the argue that values such 
as embracing collaboration significantly facilitated members’ use of KM tools for sharing of tacit 
knowledge, engendering natural infusion of new members into the organisation. Also, Iivari & Huisman 
(2007) adopts Schein’s (1992) conceptualization of OC to develop a research model to analyze the 
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relationship between OC and the deployment of systems-development methodologies. Their results 
highlight that IS developers’ deployment of methodologies is widely linked to hierarchical cultural 
values that are oriented towards security, order, and routinization. A further significant finding from 
the study is that IS managers’ critical attitudes of the deployment of methodologies in organisations 
are influenced by values such as productivity, efficiency, and goal achievement; that is, a strong 
rational culture.
Iivari & Iivari (2011) extended on Iivari & Huisman’s (2007) work by promoting Quinn & 
Rohrbaugh’s (1983) value typology to assess the relationship between OC and the deployment of 
agile methods. They argued that a strong organisational hierarchical culture facilitates the mandatory 
implementation of agile systems-development methods, while a high developmental culture makes 
organisations dysfunctional if a more formalised agile approach is taken. Iivari & Iivari’s (2011) 
suggestion of the relationships between OC and agile system-development methods echoes the 
functionalist perspective of OC that culture should be treated as a variable to create a link between 
culture and other variables so as to offer standard direction to how culture may be managed to ensure 
organisational success.
The interpretivist paradigm argues that organisations are cultures and treats culture as a metaphor 
for organisational life (Meyerson & Martin, 1987; Smircich, 1983). In this view, culture is seen as an 
interpretive tool to allow the investigation of organisations as a social phenomenon and OC may not 
be managed in an integrative way. Martin (1992) echoes this point by suggesting that organisations 
consist of groups that are multiple, often oppose one another, and have ambiguous cultural identities. 
Thus, Martin (1992, 2002) suggests that OC should be studied from three different perspectives – 
integration, differentiation, and fragmentation.
The integration perspective of OC assumes that the organisation has a consistent culture 
across all subgroups, and members share the underlying assumptions, value symbols, and ritualised 
practices (Martin, 2002). All members of the social system have the same interpretations of cultural 
manifestations, and view explanations of processes in the same way (Schein, 2004). In this view, 
members share a common perspective on where the organisation is heading and are fully in tune with 
the underlying assumptions, beliefs and practices. Differentiation studies focus on variations within 
a group, the unavoidable influence of power, and conflicts of interest, which leads to a differentiated 
culture (Pfeffer, 1981). The differentiation perspective of OC, unlike the integration perspective, 
assumes that organisations are composed of overlapping, nested subgroups with particular cultural 
manifestations, i.e. subcultures that coexist in relationships that may be in harmony, conflict or 
indifferent to one another (Martin & Siehl, 1983). The fragmentation perspective highlights ambiguity 
as the core of culture (Martin, 2002). The paradigm of the fragmented perspective argues that culture 
shared in an organisation will differ across organisational groups (Louis, 1985), implying that culture 
can be as much a fragmenting force as a unifying one (Van Maanen & Barley, 1985). Although 
organisational members believe that they belong to a single OC, they do not seem to “agree on clear 
boundaries, cannot identify shared solutions, and do not reconcile contradictory beliefs and multiple 
identities” (Meyerson, 1991 p. 254-270).
Many IS scholars have adopted Martin’s (1992, 2002) perspectives of OC to obtain a richer 
understanding of culture and the use of IS in organisations (e.g. Dubé & Robey’s, 1999; Jackson, 
2011; Rivard et al., 2011). These aforementioned studies interpret that the dynamics of IS 
implementation activities are shaped by the conflicting and ambiguous interests of different user 
groups in organisations, creating user resistance to the organisational change embodied in the IS. 
In particular, the work of Rivard et al. (2011) adopts Martin’s (1992) three perspectives of OC to 
investigate, at the organisational and subgroup levels, the antecedents of implementing clinical 
information systems (CIS). They identify four values – quality of care, and efficiency, of clinical 
practices (integration perspective analysis), professional status/autonomy and medical dominance 
(differentiation perspective analysis), which play vital roles in CIS implementation in hospitals. 
Their analysis from the fragmentation perspective reveals that hospital stakeholders occasionally 
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have ambiguous understandings of either some CIS characteristics and/or implementation practices 
in terms of their consistency with the existing four central values. Similarly, Jackson (2011) adopts 
Martin’s conceptualisation of OC to investigate the adoption and implementation of a virtual learning 
environment (VLE) in further- and higher-education establishments in the UK. His findings suggest 
that the organisations’ VLE implementation failures were due to the conflicts, inconsistencies and 
ambiguities that arose during the implementation process.
The above-mentioned authors have subjectively imposed each of the cultural perspectives as 
an interpretive framework to investigate their research problem. Thus, there is an advantage to 
using multiple perspectives of OC because multiple lenses highlight relations between different 
organisational viewpoints, as opposed to the singular-lens approach characterised in most IS-OC 
studies (e.g. Alavi et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2003; Iivari & Iivari, 2011). The use of multiple lenses 
helps reduce theoretical blind spots related to a single perspective and allow the emergence of a more 
holistic understanding of the cultural dimensions of organisations (Martin, 2002).
The above examples of the application of OC in IS research highlight that OC shapes the way that 
groups would appreciate a new system. These IS-culture studies suggest that conflicting outcomes of 
IS implementations should be expected, rather than seen as an anomaly. Thus, the shared culture of a 
collective would determine the interpretations of the system and subsequently influence usage. This 
social shaping concept suggests that cultural groups’ view IS as symbolic (Kaarst-Brown & Robey, 
1999; Robey & Boudreau, 1999), i.e. IS will symbolise different values to different user groups.
Despite adopting Martin’s (1992) OC perspectives as theoretical lenses for our study, in the 
attempt to predict and measure the complex concept of OC, Schein’s (1985) definition of values is 
chosen for our study to conceptualise OC and subcultures. Organisational values are easier to study 
compare to underlying assumptions/beliefs, which are invisible and preconscious (Alavi et al., 2006; 
Leidner & Kayworth, 2006). This is appropriate as values are reflections of underlying cultural 
assumptions (Schein, 1992) and because there is evidence of a strong linkage between cultural 
values and subsequent behaviour and actions of social groups (Posner & Munson, 1979). Applying 
the organisational values concept to the IS context suggests that values of an organisation would 
influence the implementation of an IS (Alavi et al., 2006).
While the reviewed IS-culture studies are relevant to IS research, they do not provide sufficient 
insight into how OC could explain the achievement of an IS outcome. Instead, they focus on how 
ISs are enacted in particular cultural contexts from the cultural members’ perspective to show how 
members manifest multiple and inconsistent interpretations of an IS, based on their different cultures. 
Our study adds to the IS-culture studies by exploring the implication possible salient cultural practices 
may have on the outcome of IS implementation by examining organisation–wide factors as well as 
nuances from subcultures using integration and differentiation model of analysis. None of the existing 
IS-culture studies has taken this approach (Rivard et al., 2011). We envisage that taking this approach 
will enable us to better explore the complexity and multi-dimensionality of members’ actions during 
the IS implementation process, so as to better understand why IS implementations fail.
MeTHOdOLOGy
We conducted an in-depth case study of a large, global Nigerian bank in order to understand the 
influence of organisational subcultures on the implementation outcome of a management information 
system (MIS). The case study strategy is beneficial because it enables the study of IS in its natural 
setting to obtain an understanding of the nature and complexity of the processes involving the IS 
artefact (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 1987). Using the case study approach, we adopt the “soft 
positivism” research philosophy, which provides the opportunity to reveal pre-existing phenomena 
and relationships among them (Kirsch, 2004). In our case, it allowed us to conduct the data analysis 
with certain expectations based on prior theory, but also to obtain some unexpected findings and 
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explanations from our data, in the manner of the interpretivist approach (Ravishankar et al., 2011). 
We discuss our case study approach below.
Motivating Assumptions
Similar to the procedure of Ravishankar et al. (2011), we conducted our fieldwork at Alpha Bank, with 
a premise that organisational subcultures exist, influence the outcome of MIS implementation, and 
are identifiable using an existing theoretical lens. This position captures the positivism inherent in our 
study. Accordingly, our study draws on Martin’s (2002) integration and differentiation perspectives 
of organisational subcultures to objectively analyse the MIS implementation process in Alpha 
Bank. Nonetheless, we were open to the interpretivist position during the interviews, which allowed 
informants to describe, in their own words, their experiences and views of working in a group, and in 
the organisation as a whole, thereby highlighting the subcultures and OC, respectively. This enabled 
us to explore questions on what Alpha Bank members generally thought about the MIS, and how 
it related to their values and priorities. Further, using the subjective mode of analysis helped us to 
identify themes that explain the degree of influence (i.e. saliency) of members’ cultural practices on 
the MIS implementation, providing a deeper understanding of the IS implementation phenomenon.
Case Access and data Collection
The case study focuses on a Nigerian Bank, Alpha Bank (a pseudonym), which operates in the main 
financial centres including London, New York, and Paris. The research focus guided the selection of 
the case study site; consequently, we selected Alpha Bank as it had recently implemented a robust 
enterprise MIS, and showed evidence of members manifesting different interpretations of the system. 
This provided an opportunity to understand the implementation of an IS from the OC perspective. The 
first author conducted intensive fieldwork at Alpha Bank in the form of 62 semi-structured interviews 
with 47 key informants in the bank’s headquarters in Lagos, Nigeria (see Table 1).
The interviews used a snowball approach (Patton, 2002) based on members’ recommendations 
when asked: “Which other senior members use the MIS system?”. The interviewees were from the 
Finance, Information Technology (IT) and Operations groups of the bank. We tape-recorded and 
transcribed 59 interviews. Three interviewees refused to be tape-recorded; therefore, recording of these 
interviews involved taking notes and expanding these into field notes immediately after the interviews.
An interview schedule was developed based on existing literature on organisational culture and 
organisational implementation of IS. To understand Alpha bank members’ perceptions of the MIS 
and how it related to their values, assumptions, and priorities, informants were asked to provide 
examples of how the values they subscribed to at the organisational and subgroup levels influenced 
their interactions with, and usage of, the system, and the implementation outcome. For example, 
informants were asked to discuss and describe the components of the values they subscribed at the 
organisational and their subgroup levels. Informants were invited to explain if they thought their 
subgroup had distinctiveness regarding organisational culture that made it different or similar to the 
organisation as a whole. Further, they were asked how Alpha bank’s culture as a whole and their 
subgroup’s subculture impacted the implementation of the MIS. We cross-referenced the informants’ 
Table 1. Summary of interviews and interviewees’ positions at Alpha Bank
Group Senior-level managers Middle-level managers Low-level managers Total
Finance 6 17 7 30
Information Technology 5 5 3 13
Operations 4 8 7 19
Total 15 30 17 62
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claims with many other participants that also made similar claims. The interviews were supplemented 
with unobtrusive observations of members in their settings, and, in some instances, observations of 
members in their interactions with the MIS. Formal documents in the form of the business case for 
the MIS, and memos and e-mail correspondence regarding policies for the use of the MIS, were used 
as multiple sources of evidence and for triangulation purposes, providing validity to the study (Yin, 
2009). The research data was collected over a seven-month period.
data Analysis
The data analysis followed the three concurrent activities identified by Miles & Huberman’s (1994): 
data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification. The data reduction stage involved 
carefully reading all the interview transcripts and field notes several times to interpret and code the 
informants’ perceptions of Alpha Bank’s culture (at the organisational and subgroup levels), and the 
resulting implications of their interactions with the MIS. We coded based on similar statements that 
best described the informants’ views, attitudes and relationship with the MIS during the implementation 
process from the perspectives of Alpha Bank’s OC (integration) and subcultures (differentiation). 
We created five coding categories: “implementation process,” “Alpha Bank’s organisational culture,” 
Alpha Bank’s subcultures,” “implication of Alpha Bank’s organisational culture on the implementation 
outcome,” and “implication of Alpha Bank’s subcultures on the implementation outcome.” Also, while 
coding each interview transcript, the degree of influence (saliency) of members’ cultural practices on 
the implementation of the IS was determined by rating particular employee actions and behaviours 
as highly significant, significant, less significant and insignificant, as revealed from the collected 
data. We applied ratings by reading transcripts. Informants’ indications that organisational/subgroup 
values had highly significant, or significant impacts on the way they engaged with the MIS and we 
coded the implementation outcome as salient. We coded informants’ suggestions that organisational/
subgroup values had a less significant or insignificant bearing on their engagements with the MIS and 
the implementation outcome as latent. The resulting set of categories and codes are listed in Table 2.
The three authors were involved in the data coding, but the authors independently reviewed the 
coding scheme and subsequently discussing coding decisions to reach an agreement. These ensured 
data interpretations were accurate and to avoid coding bias. The second stage of the data analysis 
involved displaying the data in matrix format. This included creating a series of conceptually ordered 
displays to study the themes in more depth. The matrix summarises each of the different aspects of 
the two broad theoretical lenses (integration and differentiation perspectives of OC) on the explored 
phenomenon (IS implementation outcome) (see Table 3 in the Discussion section). This helped to 
generate more explanatory power to facilitate the drawing of valid conclusions from the findings in 
the final stage of the analysis. Upon completion of the second stage of data analysis, we conducted 
a conclusion/verification stage. The goal was to identify common, unique and causal features in the 
Table 2. Categories and codes for organisational culture construct
Category Example Codes
Implementation process
Design and development of the MIS (pre-implementation), members’ 
participation, use (implementation) and extended use of the MIS (post-
implementation)
Alpha Bank’s organisational culture Alpha Bank’s organisation-wide interpretations, values, and behaviours
Alpha Bank’s subcultures IT, finance, and operations groups’ interpretations, values and behaviours
Implication of Alpha Bank’s organisational 
culture on the implementation outcome Salient, latent
Implication of Alpha Bank’s subcultures on 
the implementation outcome Salient, latent
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data that would present fresh insights into the different interactive processes that occurred during the 
IS implementation process. To facilitate this procedure, the literature was revisited to synthesise our 
findings with existing studies. This synthesis helped us to develop our theoretical insights (see Pan 
& Tan, 2011) into the impact of organisational/subcultural values on IS implementation outcome.
Case description
The studied MIS is a three-tiered software architecture that was developed internally to speed up 
the process of complex data analysis to generate sophisticated management information and reports 
to facilitate timely strategic decisions. Some members of the finance and operation groups worked 
with the IT group to ensure that the specific functional requirements of the different departments 
were accommodated in the MIS. The introduction of the MIS was born of necessity, intended to 
replace outdated and manual methods of performing organisational tasks, such as relying on Excel 
spreadsheets and existing legacy systems. Before the implementation of the MIS, user acceptance 
tests were conducted. After the completion of these tests, the system was introduced to members 
through a range of promotional campaigns to raise awareness of the new system and training sessions. 
Alpha Bank expected all members who had participated in the training sessions to use the MIS for 
their daily organisational tasks.
Table 3. MIS implementation from the integration and differentiation perspectives of organisational culture
Implementation Stages
Pre- Implementation Implementation Post-Implementation
Interpretation Behaviour Interpretation Behaviour Interpretation Behaviour
Organisation-
wide culture
Members’ 
interpretations 
of design and 
integration of 
the MIS into the 
existing bank’s 
legacy systems 
facilitated by the 
organisation-
wide value of 
resilience.
Members 
showed 
resilience 
(“can do” 
attitude) 
when faced 
with design 
challenges 
of the MIS.
Members’ 
interpretations 
of the MIS use, 
facilitated by the 
organisation-
wide value 
(resilience).
Accepted 
use of the 
system.
Members’ saw 
the MIS as 
commonplace.
Members 
were able to 
use the MIS 
effectively.
Level of 
influence High ++++ Moderate +++ Low ++
Subcultures
Finance group 
members 
uncomfortable 
integrating the 
MIS into their 
processes due to 
their accuracy-
driven sub-value.
The IT 
group’s 
conflicts 
with some 
finance 
group 
members’ 
slightly 
hindered the 
adaptation 
and 
integration 
of the MIS 
into Alpha 
Bank.
Subgroups’ 
interpretations 
of the MIS 
use were 
inconsistent 
with their 
accuracy- and 
superstar-driven 
sub-values.
Many 
finance and 
operations 
group 
members 
refused 
to use the 
MIS.
Differing 
interpretations 
between the 
subgroups 
that the MIS 
could be used 
effectively to 
produce accurate 
results and 
perform dynamic 
analysis.
Many 
members 
found it 
difficult to 
use the MIS 
as a regular 
daily tool.
Level of 
influence Low + High++++
Very High 
+++++
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FINdINGS
This section reports the findings concerning how saliencies of organisational subcultures in Alpha 
Bank impacted the implementation outcome of its MIS.
Analysing the data from the integration perspective of OC revealed some shared interpretations, 
experiences, beliefs and values that were clear and consistent among members across the bank. In 
particular, informants at Alpha Bank talked about their subscription to the bank’s core value of 
resilience. Members of the bank are expected to think, communicate and be persistent when they 
face challenges in tasks assigned to them. This attitude is considered an essential ingredient in the 
way assignments are executed at Alpha Bank, with members required to embrace tasks regardless 
of the scale of the challenge presented. This attitude of “nothing is impossible” was identified as a 
defining feature of the bank’s recovery from an ailing organisation in 2005, to currently one of the 
top three banks in West Africa. The shared nature of the resilience value suggests that members 
believed that they were united in their attitudes and responses to any challenges and issues faced 
when completing their work tasks.
Nonetheless, analysing the data from the differentiation perspective of OC revealed that the 
finance, IT, and operations groups had their distinct subcultures. The core characteristic of the 
finance group’s subculture was their emphasis on accuracy in every task undertaken by the group. 
The group members believed that their standards of accuracy were higher than other parts of the bank 
and that their work outputs were the most thorough. The IT group perceived themselves as doing 
things in practical and technical ways to attain organisational effectiveness; i.e. they manifested a 
“pragmatic”-driven subculture. The operations group responsible for the re-engineering of any and 
all of the business groups/subsidiaries in Alpha Bank felt that they were the engine of the bank’s 
progress and consequently had an ego-driven attitude. They manifested a “superstar” culture, and had 
an air of arrogance, feeling that they should have been given the discretion to select which methods or 
processes to adopt in achieving their tasks. These identified organisational subcultures were the only 
cultures many of the informants consistently spoke about when asked about the values they subscribed 
to at the organisational and subgroup levels and appeared to be consistent with Martin’s (1992, 2002) 
classification of OC. The results section, below, examines how Alpha Bank’s OC (integration and 
differentiation) influenced implementation of the MIS.
Impact of Organisation-wide Value (Resilience) on the Implementation Outcome
The data showed that when Alpha Bank began to develop and install the MIS, the bank’s core value of 
resilience had a positive impact on the adaptation of the MIS into its organisational setting. Members 
identified a number of examples in which their resilience to problems and challenges during the 
early stages of the MIS project ensured that progress continued. These attitudes were demonstrated 
through problems being directly addressed and members working hard to meet deadlines. This 
required additional meetings and considerable time demands on both teams, but their shared desire 
to overcome the challenge helped to facilitate the functional changes to be made. One informant 
made the following observations:
The way they [the MIS IT team] are doing things, they have exhibited the value of the bank, being 
resilient, at times you want to design a template in the MIS for report generation and the MIS [IT] 
team’s timelines are tight but this report is crucial … so they are spirited in their efforts to make 
sure that you get [a] report to meet your deadline, even when we had not provided our requirements 
for the MIS at the time they had stipulated. They more or less [embody] the resilient culture of the 
bank.” Business Operations Support (operations group)
Journal of Global Information Management
Volume 25 • Issue 1 • January-March 2017
10
There were also situations in which, although the standard functionality of the MIS represented 
a reduction in quality compared to the legacy systems, the finance and IT group members were 
determined to work together to resolve the problems and recreate the necessary report outputs.
At the initial stage of trying to develop the MIS, it was very tough for the IT team and us … because 
some of our processes were not enhanced within the MIS. We did not have [the] ability to store some 
data … but we showed resilience, we kept on fighting. We kept on trying to align those reports until 
it was achieved … it is commendable. Senior Credit Analyst (finance group)
The resilience value helped significantly to support teamwork and collaboration between the 
different groups (IT, finance and operations) when capturing the requirements of the MIS, and 
designing required non-standard functionality to adapt the new system into Alpha Bank’s organisational 
settings. When the MIS system was rolled out, the informants commented that their resilient attitudes 
had helped when they found the MIS difficult to use to complete their organisational tasks, such as 
when the system returned inaccurate data or reports:
The resilience culture applies because, as an example, we had challenges in using the system effectively 
in our unit. Because we had the ‘can do it’ attitude, it made us resilient, and we kept trying till we 
got it right. This resilience culture … has made the use of MAXIM enjoyable to us now. Head of Risk 
Management (finance group)
Similar attitudes were also reported within the Operation Group. For example, one manager 
remarked:
The IT Group like every other group in the bank is resilient in their ways, they tend to bend [over] 
backwards to make sure that users are comfortable with their systems, especially the MIS, which 
helped us to engage with it. Business Operations Support (operations group)
The positive behaviour towards the MIS due to the shared resilience value encouraged members 
to overcome the challenges and issues faced when using the MIS for their organisational work. This 
positive behaviour (“can-do” approach to problem solving) made members use the MIS effectively, 
which had a positive influence on the implementation process.
The data also indicated that subcultural differences in the bank also had an impact on the 
implementation of the system into the organisation. This resulted in the lack of engagement with 
and user resistance to the new system, with many members engaging and using the MIS as little as 
possible. This is discussed in the subsequent section.
Impact of Subcultural (Accuracy- and Superstar-driven) 
Values on the Implementation Outcome
During the early implementation activities, there was some evidence of conflicts between the IT and 
finance group when configuring modules for the MIS. The battles occurred during the design stage 
concerning the type of functionality that the MIS could support. For example, some finance group 
members were cautious about adopting the MIS, as they were suspicious of the quality of the system 
and the level of accuracy that it could support. This suggests that the finance group’s subcultural 
assumptions of accuracy influenced the speed with which they adopted the new system.
We had problems in integrating the MIS into our work processes, because of the sensitivity involved 
in our work and getting the account/figures right. We have a specific format, financial statistics, 
designed by the Central Bank that must be followed, so we needed to map all the general ledgers 
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to align with that. So we [did not] trust the MIS to be integrated into our systems. Senior Financial 
Analyst (finance group) 
Similar disagreements also ensued between the IT Group and the Operations Group during the 
development of MAXIM. In this example, there was some confusion between the different groups 
with the reports that were being generated from the system not meeting the needs of the Operations 
team. This required several attempts to create reports that were useful to the operations team and this 
delay, and lack of availability of information was thought to be hindering the effective performance 
of the group. An informant commented,
When they (MAXIM IT Team) did the query, it wasn’t what we wanted, so we went back and forth, 
it was difficult, and it was affecting performance. Business Operations Support (operations group) 
The above comments indicate that some members did not have common perceptions regarding 
how they could adapt the MIS for their organisational use. In many ways, this is in line with Wagner 
& Newell’s (2004) suggestion that differentiation between teams’ sets back IS implementation. 
However, during this pre-implementation stage i.e. design, development and adaptation of the MIS 
into the bank’s settings, the wider consensus among the informants was that the bank’s resilience 
value impacted positively on the development of the MIS, providing a positive force to continue the 
MIS implementation into Alpha Bank’s organisational setting. In other words, the organisation-wide 
value of resilience was more salient than the finance subcultural value of accuracy.
Upon introducing the system for organisational use, the finance group members continued to 
question whether the utilization of the MIS was consistent with the group’s accuracy-driven culture. 
Informants explained that they were unsure that the system would generate the information required 
for the finance group to produce accurate reports for senior management and regulatory bodies. 
Several group members commented that they were more comfortable with, and had more confidence 
in, their established methods of working, and had been unwilling to engage with the new system:
There was resistance when the MIS was introduced mainly because people didn’t know the system, 
so we did not trust it or the figures generated from it. We had to be careful we didn’t send inaccurate 
information to top management or regulatory bodies because of the use of the MIS, so we used 
the old manual system instead that we were familiar with. Head of Balance Sheet and Market Risk 
Management (finance group)
The mistrust of the new MIS was compounded by some negative experiences when attempting 
to use it. For example, informants reported that they found that the system did not have the expected 
levels of functionality. They suggested the MIS produced inaccurate or incomplete data or was not 
configured to fit with the requirements of the finance groups’ calculations:
We noticed that there are some things that are so basic that you thought [the] MIS would do and you 
just noticed it is not working as expected … [such as] errors and omissions in the figures; you will 
be disappointed … so you can’t use the system.” Head of Financial Subsidiaries (finance group)
Thus, the finance group was reluctant to adopt the MIS because it did not allow them to achieve 
levels of reliability and accuracy that were seen as core values for their group. The informants in the 
operations group reported similar experiences, explaining that their department was less formal and 
structured in the way they completed tasks compared to other departments. The operations group 
felt they had discretion to decide which method or processes to adopt, including the use of an IS to 
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maximise their outputs and achieve target levels of performance. Thus, they felt the introduction of 
the MIS undermined their discretional approach:
Well, delivery is important to us, so discretion is allowed to come into play, even in the use of IS. 
We cannot do otherwise because … we keep getting deadlines for this, and that from management 
passed down to us every day, so we like to get the job done in our preferred methods. That is how we 
work and get the job done. The use of the MIS was not allowing us discretion, [so] we did not use it. 
Cards Administrator (operations group)
Thus, during the implementation stage (system roll out for organisational use), the subcultural 
differences began to have a greater influence on the implementation process. The differentiated 
subcultures were more salient compared to the integrated organisation-wide value of resilience.
After introducing the MIS to users, senior management expected members to continue to use the 
system on a routine basis (i.e. post-implementation). However, in practice, many members rarely used 
the MIS as the lack of engagement and user resistance to the system that had started since its rollout 
had increased. The organisation-wide value of resilience (integration) was becoming very latent due 
to the growing saliency of the subcultural effects (differentiation). This was evident in comments 
from informants in both the finance and operations groups. The finance group, who were highly 
concerned with “accuracy efficiency,” chose to run the MIS in parallel with their existing systems 
and methods so that they had a trusted alternative if any doubts arose over the reliability of the data 
from the MIS. This also enabled them to continue using their preferred established techniques and 
reduced the need to rely on the new system. Therefore, there was little evidence from this group that 
they considered the use of the MIS as a normal and everyday occurrence. One informant explained:
The use of the MIS was running in parallel with our existing methods of financial analysis … this may 
have affected our use of the MIS and the failure of the project, but the accuracy of our work is more 
vital to us, and that can only be guaranteed by the use of the methods we are already comfortable 
with. Head of Risk Management (finance group) 
As well as doubting the reliability of the information from the MIS, finance group members also 
expressed concerns about the speed at which the IT group had attempted to implement the new system. 
The finance group had been keen to conduct multiple replication tests of the system to confirm that 
it was producing the same results as their existing methods. However, the IT group pragmatically felt 
that this would have represented an excessive testing routine and delayed the project unnecessarily. 
A member of the IT group explained:
Due to the finance [group’s] value of accuracy, there was friction when initial concerns over the 
accuracy of the reports arose. Naturally, in any project, the bringer of change needs to give a case for 
what value the change brings. … finance wanted first to see a replication of what was on the ground 
before seeking improvements, whereas IT, because of efficiency, would want to skip the middle stage 
and go straight to improvements. That is where the conflicts arose, and it discouraged finance from 
using the MIS in effective ways, leading to the failure of the system. Database Administrator (IT group) 
Informants in the operations group made similar observations. They had different perceptions 
of the MIS capabilities and felt it was not easy to use. Many in this group only used the MIS for data 
extraction purposes and used the more familiar Microsoft Excel software for data analysis. These 
members decided not to rely on the MIS, feeling that the MIS alone would not enable them to achieve 
effectiveness in their work, and thus combined its use with other methods, highlighting the group’s 
preference for a discretionary approach. One senior manager explained:
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I may be able to do analysis in the MIS but for my performance, I prefer to export generated data 
from the MIS to Excel for analysis because it is quicker, so I don’t really use the new MIS. Head of 
Operational Control (operations group) 
This attitude of the operations group caused conflict with the IT group. The operations group 
stated that sole use of the MIS was not quick enough; however, the IT team argued against this. A 
senior programmer explained:
The data for all calculations and analysis are in the MIS. It can be extracted. Just because it … hasn’t 
been requested doesn’t mean it isn’t doable. I am sure if it is requested, we can give them what they 
want, rather than causing the failure of the project. Senior Programmer (IT group)
This non-routine usage resulted in the failure of the implemented MIS because members did 
not use the system in a way that could achieve the organisational goal of speeding up the process of 
complex data analysis to generate sophisticated management information for timely strategic decisions. 
The above comments suggest that the problem related not to a lack of functionality, but to a lack of 
access to the relevant functionality, which the operations group had not requested. The operations 
group’s superstar-driven attitude and preference for their discretionary approach prevented them from 
fully engaging with the pragmatic IT group (who were practical but reactive) to request traditional 
tasks to be automated in the MIS. The operations group’s ego-driven and superstar mentality may 
have clouded their view of what constituted a highly useable system. Therefore, it appears that 
a user-developer gap had emerged concerning required and available functionality, and this was 
compounding the low levels of engagement with the MIS from the operations group. The conflicts 
between the IT and operations groups originated from the latter’s view that the MIS would not allow 
them to be effective, and the former’s expectations that the MIS could be continuously adapted to 
meet the expected level of sophistication as long as the operations group made such requests known 
to them. This breakdown between the different groups is encapsulated in the following comments:
The problem is that people that are sitting on the MIS side, they know only coding, and they don’t 
know what banking is all about. We need somebody who can understand both, [and this is the] reason 
why the implementation outcome was unfavourable. Head of Card Operations (Operations Group)
The above comments highlight the negative impact the very salient disagreements had on the usage 
of the MIS, which is consistent with Martin’s (1992, 2002) differentiation perspective of OC, resulting 
in the failure of the MIS project. It appears that the new system did not support the finance group’s 
core value of accuracy or the operations group’s way of working via discretionary/unconventional 
methods. These differences and conflicts hindered the communication and interaction between the 
subgroups when the MIS was implemented and used in a routine manner. These factors prevented 
the system from being integrated further into the bank and was consequently unbeneficial for the 
MIS implementation. Similar to findings by Ravishankar et al. (2011) and Rivard et al. (2011), the 
differences in cultures between the IT and finance/operations groups was the reason for the conflict. 
These members were not interested in using the system in a routine and comprehensive manner to 
support higher-level tasks in the organisation.
Our analysis also indicates that although the organisation-wide value of resilience was consistent 
across the three subgroups, the subgroups existed in relative isolation to one another. The subgroups in 
the bank operated a “silo mentality” that resulted in their behaviours and views being heavily influenced 
by their own group’s agenda and priorities, as highlighted by the Head of the Operations Group:
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One of the main issues was that people were not just familiar with having such [a high] level of 
openness, most people were just … used to seeing what they are doing only in their silos.
A Database Administrator added:
Despite the shared value across the bank, there are routines within each subgroup, [which are] 
significantly different from the rest, so there are different working practices in each [of] the groups.
This lack of engagement between the subgroups highlights how subcultures can coexist in a 
conflict-type relationship to one another (Martin & Siehl, 1983), and the significant impact contrasting 
cultural traditions can play during IS implementations.
dISCUSSION
Our case study reveals a clear pattern that the task characteristics in the preceding stage of the MIS 
implementation had an impact on the subsequent stages. The integrated organisation-wide value of 
resilience was salient in the pre-implementation stage. The shared resilience among members had 
a vital positive influence on their commitment to the design and installation of the system. In the 
pre-implementation stage when the MIS adaptation started, many members of the IT, finance and 
operation subgroups displayed positive integrative behaviours in handling the issues that arose during 
the design, development, and installation of the MIS. Because many organisation-wide members 
interpreted the tasks and activities of the MIS adaptation regarding its consistency with Alpha 
Bank’s value of resilience, a consensus was reached across and within subgroups i.e. Martin’s (1992) 
integration perspective of OC). Alpha Bank’s organisation-wide value of resilience may be described 
as having a high influence on its members’ positive behaviour towards successful adaptation of the 
MIS into the bank’s organisational settings. This finding is similar to those of McMaster & Wastell 
(2005), which highlight that factors such as commitment of organisational members were important 
antecedents in the development and deployment of a business process re-engineering system. However, 
our study shows that even at this early pre-implementation stage there was some evidence of conflicts 
between the IT and finance groups when configuring modules for the MIS. Their interpretations of 
the business terms and functionalities differed, leading to disagreement between these subgroups. 
Despite the evidence of differentiated subcultures engendering resisting behaviours towards the MIS 
during the pre-implementation stage, the resisting actions were latent most of the time, consequently 
not hindering the MIS to progress to the implementation stage.
When the MIS was introduced to the wider bank populace for organisational use (implementation 
stage), the integrated organisation-wide value of resilience became less salient as differentiation 
across Alpha Bank’s subgroups emerged (conflicts and disagreements) and became more salient. 
Many members in the finance and operations groups interpreted the use of the MIS as inconsistent 
with their respective subgroup values of accuracy and discretionary approach, causing them to 
resist the system. The differentiation effects continued, as they were most salient during the post-
implementation stage. Very few members used the MIS in a regular way or considered its use as part 
of their everyday work activities, implying that the integrated organisation-wide value of resilience 
became very latent. The resistance from the finance and operations groups continued to prevent the 
system from being assimilated further into the bank. The members were not interested in using the 
system in a routine way, as their core concerns regarding the reliability of the data produced by the 
system had not been addressed (finance group) and use of the MIS prevented the use of discretionary 
processes (operations group). Therefore, the salient differentiation in Alpha Bank led to high levels 
of user resistance, resulting in the failure of the MIS. The interpretations and behaviours during the 
MIS implementation are summarised in Table 3.
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The empirical data show how Alpha Bank members’ attitudes and behaviours dynamically 
changed, shaped by the forces that were manifested due to their interactions with the MIS in the 
implementation stages of the system. The members’ manifestations of the organisation-wide value 
of resilience towards the MIS was most salient in the pre-implementation stage, but latent in the 
implementation and post-implementation stages, where their “can do” attitude seemed to be less 
forthcoming. Members should have manifested the resilience value especially in the later stages of 
the post-implementation process to overcome the complexities and difficulties related to effectively 
using the MIS. Thus, the subcultural elements took precedence in the implementation stage and grew 
in saliency in the post-implementation stage. The implementation of an MIS was not the central part 
of the finance and operation member’s jobs – it was thought to support them to complete their tasks 
and overcome work challenges. Therefore, it is possible that when the members did not consider 
something to be a particular type of work problem, the manifestation of the resilience value became 
less necessary and the subcultural values came to the fore. The change in the members’ cultural 
values during their interactions with the MIS contrasts with Schein’s (1999) argument that culture 
is relatively stable and difficult to change. It may be that the organisation-wide value of resilience 
became latent to the salient subgroups’ values because the introduction of the MIS changed their work 
patterns. For example, the operations group members normally had the discretion to decide on which 
methods or processes to adopt in their work. Thus, the expectation that the MIS should be the only 
tool for producing management information was contradictory to the operations group’s norm. This 
description mirrors Leidner & Kayworth’s (2006) explanation of how the introduction of an IS can 
cause conflict between cultures; i.e. how cultural conflicts are manifested. Ravishankar et al. (2011) 
also highlight the potential for cultures to change; they identified a “chameleon” subculture during 
organisational attempts to align an implemented Knowledge Management System with organisational 
strategy. This “chameleon” subculture did not identify strongly with the organisation’s values or their 
subgroup value; they only adopted the values of the subgroup they were temporarily seconded to; i.e. 
they changed their subculture to integrate into different subcultures.
Our subcultural analysis explores the multiple meanings of Alpha Bank members in their 
interactions with the MIS, paying attention to the absence of consensus (and the presence of conflict 
and power struggle) in the use of the system, engendering an unfavorable outcome for the MIS 
implementation. This is contrary to the majority of IS implementation/culture studies, which adopt only 
the integration perspective (e.g. Alavi et al., 2006; Hoffman & Klepper, 2000; Iivari & Huisman, 2007). 
Our findings show that the failure of an IS was largely dependent on decisions made at the subgroup 
levels. Thus, if IS success was measured by whether or not the new MIS was successfully integrated 
into the organisation settings, it would have been perceived that the new system was successful due 
to Alpha bank members’ initial display of resilience towards the MIS during the pre-implementation 
stage. However, in reality, the implementation was a failure due to members’ differentiated attitudes 
toward the MIS during the later stages of the implementation process.
Our study highlights that the different manifestations of the integration and differentiation 
behaviours, although isolated from each other, each came to the fore with different salience during 
the MIS implementation. Dubé & Robey (1999) explain that overlapping manifestations that these 
different perspectives reveal can evolve in a rather sequential manner. We argue that the saliency 
of the various cultural practices emerged and shifted over time because as the system progressed 
from the pre-implementation stage to the implementation and post-implementation stages, members 
developed a stronger affiliation to their subcultures rather than to the organisation-wide culture. This 
prevented members to use the MIS in a continuous and enhanced manner. This is similar to Iivari 
& Iivari’s (2011) and Von Meier’s (1999) arguments that cultural members socially reconstruct the 
meanings and purposes of their activities when they perceive the use of a new system as too complex 
and challenging. In our study, due to the perceived complexity of the MIS, Alpha Bank members were 
unable to gain an implicit sense of how to use the system in a routine manner. This led to a situation 
where they had to restructure their organisational processes, changes that did not match, but rather 
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conflicted with many of the members’ subgroup values, causing resistance and disengagements with 
the MIS. Thus, the differentiated subcultures prevailed over the integrated one; that is, the salient 
subcultural practices stifled the organisation-wide display of resilience.
It is worth pointing out that the organisational subcultures identified in Alpha Bank may also 
have been catalyzed from outside the organisation; i.e. by the influence of Nigeria’s culture at the 
national level. Hofstede’s (1983) taxonomy, which describes national cultures along the dimensions 
of pragmatism– normative, individualism–collectivism, and masculinity–femininity, could help 
provide more insights on how these subcultures were manifested in Alpha Bank. Nigeria scores 
very low (13) on a scale of 100 of the pragmatism–normative dimension, suggesting a normative 
culture (The Hofstede Centre, 2014). This may explain why the finance (emphasis on accuracy) and 
operations (superstar attitude) groups were entrenched in their ideas and ways. These respective group 
members exhibited great respect for their traditions and were consequently unwilling to adapt to the 
implemented MIS. On the individualism–collectivism dimension, Nigeria scores 30, meaning it is 
a collectivistic-oriented society, that is, long-term commitment to the member “group” is key, and 
overrides external rules and regulations (The Hofstede Centre, 2014). This may also explain why 
the subcultures were relative isolated, and group members were hesitant to change their practices 
when the MIS was implemented. Finally, for the masculinity–femininity dimension, Nigeria scores 
60, highlighting a competitive society in which conflicts are typically resolved by fighting them out 
(The Hofstede Centre, 2014). This may explain the sharp disagreements and battles between the IT 
group and the finance/operations groups during the MIS implementation process. Therefore, our case, 
a global bank with several foreign members, highlight that there may still be a strong link between 
domestic national cultures and deep-seated shared cultural assumptions at the subgroup level. Thus 
our findings provide insights into how global organisations based in countries similar to Nigeria 
could manage IS implementations. For example, China (66), India (56) and Saudi Arabia (60) have 
similar masculinity–femininity dimension scores to Nigeria’s 60. Also, China (25), Russia (39) and 
Saudi Arabia (30) have similar individualism–collectivism dimension scores to Nigeria’s score of 30.
CONCLUSION
Our adoption of the dual perspectives of OC (i.e. integration and differentiation, as posited by 
Martin 1992, 2002) provided an interpretive lens to guide the analysis of MIS implementation from 
the OC perspective. It also provided a rich account of how agreements and disagreements that arise 
during members’ interactions and use of an MIS can influence the implementation outcome of the 
system. Thus, our paper provides clear insights on how differences and conflicts between subculture 
groups hindered the successful implementation of an MIS. The results enhance our understanding 
of IS implementation research from the dual perspective of OC, an aspect that has received limited 
attention in the IS implementation/OC literature (Leidner & Kayworth, 2006). The contributions of 
our paper are as follows.
Firstly, our study of IS implementation suggests that increased saliency of members’ subscription 
to an organisation-wide value facilitated the successful adaptation of the IS (pre-implementation 
stage). But in subsequent stages (implementation and pre-implementation), an increase in saliency of 
the subcultural values resulted in members’ resisting the system, leading to its failure. This provides 
fresh insights on how salient subcultural practices can lead to IS failures despite the existence of a 
strong organisation-wide value. This helps answer our research question: How do salient organisation-
wide and subgroup values influence the outcome of IS implementation? Also, it answers the call 
to explore the impact the saliency of a given cultural perspective may have on the outcome of an IS 
implementation (Rivard et al., 2011).
Secondly, our study builds on and contrasts with the vast body of literature that has adopted social 
cognitive theories to explain IS implementations in organisations. For example, the Unified Theory of 
Acceptance and Use of Technology and Theory of Planned Behaviour developed by Venkatesh et al. 
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(2003) and Ajzen (1991), respectively. These theories serve as antecedents for explaining the use and 
implementation of technological innovations. They assume that manifested behaviours and practices 
that come into play during interactions with a technological innovation are quite stable during the 
implementation process (Leidner, 2010). Our adoption of OC from the integration and differentiation 
perspectives further our understanding of social cognitive models by highlighting how and why 
members’ interpretations and behaviours towards an IS may change during the implementation process.
Finally, our study makes a significant contribution to practice by demonstrating the need for 
IS practitioners to appreciate cultural variations across subgroups, as these differences may have a 
major influence on the usage and subsequent implementation of an IS. A more proactive approach 
should be taken to alter the salient negative cultural practices that can cause IS failures into more 
positive organisation-wide practices during the development and use of a new IS to achieve successful 
implementation; this will increase organisations’ likelihood of getting the best return on IS investments.
We acknowledge four limitations of our in-depth study. Firstly, the study was unable to adopt the 
fragmentation perspective of OC as a further theoretical lens to explore the implementation process 
of the MIS. Taking this perspective may have allowed us to capture the ambiguities members faced in 
the daily use of a sophisticated IS, and improve understanding of the role of OC in IS implementation 
outcomes. Therefore, further studies could adopt the three perspectives to help provide richer insights 
into IS implementations. Secondly, future research could explore the deeper role of the IS artefact 
during the implementation process. IS artefacts have their objective properties and behaviours 
(Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001), to provide fresh insights into the nature of the relationship they have 
with the actors and the organisational tasks during the implementation process. Thirdly, our study was 
unable to determine whether the subgroups exhibited the same level of influence or one was more 
dominant and if it had an impact on the implementation process. Hence, further study could explore 
these. Fourthly, to gain more insights, on the link between domestic national culture and subcultures, 
future research needs to examine relevant culture dimensions such as pragmatism– normative, 
individualism–collectivism, and masculinity–femininity and explore their moderating role during 
IS implementations. Finally, because our study was built upon a single case, we cannot generalise 
the results to a wider sample. However, we argue that the empirical results from an in-depth single 
case study provides deep insights and increases the representativeness of the views of the informants 
regarding IS implementations. Therefore, we can generalise from empirical statements to theoretical 
statements, i.e. analytical generalisability (Lee & Baskerville, 2003; Yin, 2009).
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